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1. Was the search of defendant's vehicle jus t i f i ed as 
a reasonable inventory search? 
2. Was the search of defendant's vehicle jus t i f i ed 
because police off icers had probable cause to search for 
contraband? 
3* Was the evidence introduced at tr ia l insufficient 
to convict defendant of aggravated assault? 
4 . Was the jury instruction regarding possession of 
stolen property constitutional? 
5. Was theft a lesser included offense of aggravated 
robbery with respect to the facts of this case? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAHf 
Plaint i f f -Respondent , 
- v -
RAYMOND JEFFREY JOHNSONf 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STKSEXIEm-QI-3BE-£AS& 
The defendant, Raymond Jef frey Johnson, was charged 
with one count of aggravated robbery, a f i r s t degree felony in 
v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1978), Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203(1) (4) (Supp. 1985) , Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978) , 
aggravated a s s a u l t , a third degree felony in v i o l a t i o n of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-2-202 (1978) , Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (4) 
(Supp. 1985), Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-103 (1978), and t h e f t , a 
second degree felony in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
(1978), Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (3) (Supp. 1985), Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-6-412 (1978), and Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) . 
(See Addendum A.) 
Defendant was convicted of the charged crimes in a jury 
t r i a l which commenced on January 16, 1985, before the Honorable 
Leonard H. Russon, Third Jud ic ia l D i s t r i c t Court in and for S a l t 
Lake County. Defendant was sentenced t o a term in the Utah State 
Prison for f i v e years t o l i f e for the aggravated robbery, not 
more than f i v e years for the aggravated a s s a u l t , and not l e s s 
than one or more than f i f t e e n years for t h e f t . Defendant was 
Case No. 20562 
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also sentenced t o an addi t ional one year to run consecutively 
with the previous terms for the use of a f irearm. 
SSKSSMEXI-QF-TBB-XAEXB 
On August 18, 1984, a t approximately 5:15 p.m., a man 
entered Oakwood Jewelers , located a t 2342 East 70th South in Sal t 
Lake County (R. 616-18, 1152) and forced Joanne Knaphus, a 
saleswoman, a t gunpoint, in to a bathroom in the rear of the s tore 
(R. 616-17). The man threatened t o shoot Mrs. Knaphus i f she did 
not stay in the bathroom (R. 623). She observed tha t t h i s man 
had a beard and was wearing a basebal l cap (R. 617). Although 
Mrs. Knaphus iden t i f i ed the de fendan t s brother , Allen Johnson, 
as the man who pointed the gun and forced her in to the darkened 
bathroom, she t e s t i f i e d tha t the man e x p l i c i t l y warned her not t o 
look a t him (R. 618) , therefore , she r ea l ly did not get a close 
look a t h i s face (R. 643). 
Soon thereaf te r a second accomplice entered the jewelry 
s to r e , opened the showcases, and s t a r t ed to co l l ec t the assor ted 
jewelry (R. 619). During the robbery a customer, S te l l a 
Kyarsguard, entered the s tore and saw the second accomplice, whom 
she l a t e r iden t i f i ed as Paul Branch, standing behind one of the 
showcases (R. 1227-28). Branch displayed a firearm and forced 
Mrs. Kyarsguard t o the rear of the s to re (R. 1215) where the 
f i r s t man stood guard with a gun (R. 1220). The f i r s t man 
pointed the gun a t Mrs. Kyarsguard (R. 1229) and ordered her not 
t o look a t him (R. 1221). He then grabbed Mrs. Kyarsguard by the 
arm and forced her in to the darkened bathroom where he had 
previously imprisoned the saleswoman, Mrs. Knaphus (R. 1221). 
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Mrs. Kyarsguard's l imi ted descr ipt ion of the f i r s t man with the 
gun was that he seemed t a l l (R. 1220) . After i t appeared that 
the two men had l e f t the s tore f the two l a d i e s ex i t ed the 
bathroom and observed that a l l of the jewelry which had been 
located in the various showcases was missing (R. 1225) . 
At approximately 5:15 p.m. on the day of the robbery, 
Marsha Wright and her daughter, Mistyr were s i t t i n g in t h e i r car 
in a parking l o t outs ide of Oakwood Jewelers . Both noticed two 
men, one t a l l e r than the other, carrying a large p l a s t i c garbage 
bag which appeared t o contain numerous l i t t l e boxes (R. 1079, 
1129) . Both men were described as having beards and wearing 
basebal l caps and dark c lo thes (R. 1078, 1131). They walked 
hurriedly in front of the Wrights' car (R. 1132) and jumped i n t o 
the back seat of a tan or beige car (R. 1085, 1096, 1135) already 
occupied by a man and woman (R. 1095, 1135) . The Wrights looked 
for a l i c e n s e p late number; however, no l i c e n s e p l a t e s were seen 
on the car (R. 1137-38) , however, they did not ice an oblong 
object on the rear window (R. 1089, 1137-3 8 ) . Both Marsha and 
Misty Wright p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d defendant, Raymond Johnson, 
and Paul Branch as the two men carrying the large garbage bag (R. 
1088, 1139) . 
At 5:15 p.m. on the day of the robbery, Daniel B. 
Williams was s i t t i n g in a restaurant located near Oakwood 
Jewelers (R. 1181-84) . Through a window in the restaurant he 
not iced two men, one t a l l e r than the other, bearded and wearing 
basebal l caps, walk toward Oakwood Jewelers (R. 1168, 1192) . Ten 
t o f i f t e e n minutes l a t e r he not iced the same two men walking in 
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the opposite direction (R. 1189, 1190). Mr. Williams positively 
identified defendant Raymond Johnson as the taller of the two men 
and Paul Branch as the shorter man (R. 1192). 
At approximately 5:15 p.m. on August 18, 1984 Leslie 
Clara Butler, the owner of a dance studio located near Oakwood 
Jewelers, noticed two men with beards, dressed alike, enter 
Oakwood Jewelers (R. 1150, 1152-53). Fifteen to twenty minutes 
elapsed when she noticed the two men leave the store carrying a 
large garbage bag full of something (R. 1153-55). She identified 
defendant Raymond Johnson as looking similar to one of the two 
men (R. 1156-57). 
On August 24, 1984, two plain clothes officers with the 
Los Angeles Police Department, Figueroa and Penrod, were 
routinely investigating their assigned area as part of a burglary 
and narcotics task force. At approximately 2:30 p.m., Officers 
Figueroa and Penrod drove into the parking lot of the Pink Motel 
in Los Angeles, California (R. 311-12). They observed defendant, 
Raymond Johnson in the parking lot sitting behind the wheel of a 
beige 1976 Chevrolet (R. 312-13). Defendant was using hydraulic 
lifts which are illegal in California to bounce his car up and 
down (R. 314). Officers noted that the car had no license 
plates, but had a temporary license from Utah in the rear window 
(R. 313, 396-97). 
Officers noted a woman, identified as Jeanna Salazar, 
walk out of room #10 of the Pink Motel and get into the same car 
as defendant Johnson (R. 312-13). Miss Salazar appeared to be 
under the influence of an opiate (R. 390). Officer Figaeroa 
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claimed she walked slowly and d e l i b e r a t e l y , her e y e l i d s were 
droopy and her head hung forward (R. 390) . The o f f i c e r s further 
observed through the open door of room #10 two people standing 
administering drugs intravenously (R. 315-18, 391) . 
Soon thereaf ter defendant s tarted t o leave the parking 
l o t when the o f f i c e r s observed the two ind iv idua l s in room #10 f 
Allen David Johnson, brother of Raymond Johnson, and Teresa 
Alverez, approaching Johnson's car (R. 323) . The o f f i c e r s 
stopped a l l four suspects , observed marijuana ins ide the car, saw 
fresh track marks on the ins ide of the suspects 1 arms, and 
observed that a l l suspects appeared t o be under the influence of 
a contro l led substance (R. 324-27, 394-96) . 
Off icers then placed the suspects including defendant 
Raymond Johnson under arres t for being under the influence of a 
contro l l ed substance. Officer Figueroa subsequently obtained 
consent from the suspects to search room #10 for i l l e g a l 
narcot ics and s t o l e n property (R. 397-98) . In t h e i r search, 
o f f i c e r s found a substant ia l amount of jewelry, drug 
paraphernalia, and a loaded .38 ca l iber revolver (R. 344, 399-
400) . They a l s o found jewelry and .38 ca l iber ammunition located 
in the purses and upon the persons of the suspects (R. 330, 407, 
424) . 
Upon arres t ing the suspects , o f f i c e r s impounded and 
inventoried defendant Johnson's car (R. 336) . Backup o f f i c e r s 
arr iv ing a t the Pink Motel after the a r r e s t s fol lowed a mandatory 
Los Angeles Pol ice Department c h e c k l i s t in inventorying the 
impounded car (R. 3 3 6 ) . In compliance with the department ! 
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checkl i s t (Addendum B) of f ice rs opened the hood and noticed a 
towel with "Pink Motel" printed on i t wrapped around an object 
secured underneath the hood (R. 340). Officers opened the bundle 
and found a la rge assortment of jewelry (R. 341). Also pursuant 
t o the mandatory checkl i s t (Addendum B), of f icers opened the 
trunk and saw a small unlocked box with "Oakwood Jewelry, I n c . , 
Sa l t Lake City" pr in ted on the outside of the box (R. 342)• 
Inside the box of f icers found 46 bundles containing over 1,000 
precious gems (R. 907-08) • 
Author i t ies in Sa l t Lake City were contacted and 
v e r i f i c a t i o n of the stolen property was made by the owner of the 
jewelry, Mr, Pahlke (R. 978). Police a lso obtained pawn s l i p s 
from a loca l pawn dealer and learned tha t a subs tan t i a l port ion 
of the items s to len from Oakwood Jewelers had been pawned by two 
of the suspects (R. 1322-57). Raymond Johnson and two others 
were ex t rad i ted t o Utah and charged with the aggravated a s s a u l t 
of S t e l l a Kyarsguard, the aggravated robbery of Joanne Knaphus, 
and the thef t from Oakwood Jewelers . 
A motion to suppress evidence obtained in the 
Cal i fornia a r r e s t of defendant was denied (R. 470-71). At t r i a l , 
the .38 ca l iber p i s t o l found during the search of room #10 of the 
Pink Motel was iden t i f i ed by Joanne Knaphus and as the p i s t o l 
used in the Oakwood Jewelry Store robbery (R. 652). Furthermore, 
the car impounded in Cal i fornia was reg i s te red t o Raymond Johnson 
and was iden t i f i ed by witnesses as the car in the parking l o t 
next t o Oakwood Jewelers which defendants Raymond Johnson and 
Paul Branch, carrying a large garbage bag, entered and hurr iedly 
l e f t the parking l o t (R. 1097, 1136-37). 
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The jury found defendant Johnson g u i l t y of aggravated 
robbery, aggravated a s s a u l t and t h e f t . Defendant was 
subsequently sentenced t o the Utah State Prison. 
&WMBX-QF-*RGUiaNT 
The search of defendant's v e h i c l e was j u s t i f i e d as a 
reasonable inventory search pursuant t o a necessary impoundment. 
Further f the o f f i c e r s had probable cause to be l i eve the v e h i c l e 
contained contraband. The f a c t s as known t o the o f f i c e r s , viewed 
from an objec t ive standard, supported the o f f i c e r s 1 search. The 
contraband discovered in the v e h i c l e was properly admitted i n t o 
evidence. 
Based upon a r t i c u l a b l e f a c t s proved a t t r i a l , the jury 
found the defendant g u i l t y of the aggravated as sau l t of S t e l l a 
Kyarsguard. The State proved each element of aggravated a s s a u l t 
a t l e a s t t o the extent that a reasonable man could have reached a 
verdic t beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The t r i a l court correct ly ins tructed the jury regarding 
the possess ion of recent ly s t o l e n property. The ins t ruc t ion 
maintained the burden of proof on the State s ince the ins truc t ion 
was only a permissive inference and not a mandatory rebuttable 
presumption. 
Under the f a c t s of t h i s case , the f t was not a l e s s e r 
included offense of aggravated robbery s ince the t h e f t and 
aggravated robbery were two separate a c t s within a s i n g l e 
criminal episode and therefore convic i tons and sentences on both 
could be had. 
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MCUUEUT 
JSIKT-J 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S 
AUTOMOBILE AND SEIZURE OF THE CONTRABAND 
WAS LAWFUL AND THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
ADMITTED THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT 
OF THE SEARCH. 
Defendant f i r s t contends t h e s e a r c h of h i s automobi l e 
v i o l a t e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l protect ion against unreasonable 
searches and s e i z u r e s as provided by the Fourth Amendment of the 
United S ta te s Const i tut ion . Because defendant addresses the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the search on Fourth Amendment grounds only 
and not under Art. I § 14 of the Utah State Const i tut ion the 
respondent's a n a l y s i s w i l l be l imi ted t o the reasonableness of 
the search under the Fourth Amendment. 
The quest ion of whether a search i s reasonable i s an 
i s s u e for the t r i a l court and the t r i a l cour t ' s rul ing i s not t o 
be upset unless persuasively shown t o be in error . £t3±.e_YjL 
LXPipS-Sf 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976) . 
The Fourth Amendment t o the United S t a t e s Const i tut ion 
prohib i t s unreasonable searches and s e i z u r e s . A search warrant 
must be i ssued by a neutral magistrate and based upon probable 
cause for a search to be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y permiss ib le . However, 
we l l e s tab l i shed except ions e x i s t t o the warrant requirement. An 
inventory search of an automobile and search of an automobile 
based upon probable cause are two e s tab l i shed except ions . £ss 
SDix^Daks>±&-y*-QpsejmaB, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), and UixiJt£^L£ifli£J5 
X*-BS>33, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) . 
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A. THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF 
DEFENDANT'S AUTOMOBILE WAS 
JUSTIFIED AS AN INVENTORY SEARCH 
OF AN IMPOUNDED VEHICLE. 
A warrantless search of an impounded v e h i c l e for the 
purposes of protect ing the p o l i c e and publ ic from danger, avoiding 
po l i ce l i a b i l i t y for l o s t or s t o l e n property, and protect ing the 
owner's property i s permitted by the Fourth Amendment. Ss>Mib 
PfiJto±3_YA_£pP£in£D# 428 U.S. 364 (1976); S£a±£-X*-BX9b, 711 P.2d 
264, 267 (Utah 1985); , State-2*-RomsiS>, 624 P.2d 699 (Utah 1981); 
£±a££„X*„£l£b£L££, 618 P.2d 484 (Utah 1980) . To find that 
o f f i c e r s have conducted a v a l i d inventory search "the court must 
f i r s t determine whether there was reasonable and proper 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the impoundment of the v e h i c l e . " UyaJb, 711 P.2d 
at 26 8. J u s t i f i c a t i o n for a lawful impoundment can be obtained 
through e x p l i c i t s tatutory author izat ion! or from the 
circumstances surrounding the i n i t i a l s top . £jpp£XiR3D, 428 U.S. at 
375-76; Uy.gJ>, 711 P.2d a t 268. 
In the ins tant case , no statutory authorizat ion for 
impoundment e x i s t e d under U.C.A. §§ 58-37-3 , 41-6-116.10 or 41 -1 -
115 (1953) , as amended (see Addendum A). Thus the court must look 
t o the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the 
impoundment was reasonable. 
* Utah's s t a t u t e s give a pol ice department authority t o 
impound v e h i c l e s in several s i t u a t i o n s . Vehic le s may lawful ly be 
impounded when they are used t o transport contro l l ed substances , 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-13 (1953), as amended; when the v e h i c l e i s 
improperly regis tered or s t o l e n , Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-115 
(1953); or when a v e h i c l e i s abandoned, Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-
116.10 (1953) . Uyah, 711 P.2d a t 268. 
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This Court has recent ly decided two cases , State^x* 
Jlysh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985)
 f and Ste±£-X*„Bis;£, 717 P.2d 695 
(Utah 1986) , in which an impoundment and inventory search of a car 
were found unconst i tu t ional because the impoundment and inventory 
were pretextual for a full-blown inves t iga tory search. Both cases 
are d i s t inguishable from the present case . 
In flyahr the officer stopped the defendant because 
defendant looked similar t o a suspect in a recent robbery. The 
off icer did not ask the defendant for h i s l i cense and r e g i s t r a t i o n 
nor search the car un t i l another off icer was able to go t o the 
police s t a t i o n and r e t r i eve the p ic tu re of the robbery suspect . 
The off icer in Uy.g2) then searched the car with the p ic ture of the 
suspect in h i s hand. £y.gj}, 711 P.2d a t 266, 270. Further , the 
officer did not completely search the vehic le , did not make a l i s t 
of the items in the vehic le and did not use a standard inventory 
form. JByahr 711 P.2d a t 270. F ina l ly , the officer did not ask 
defendant i f anything of value was in the vehic le nor did the 
officer give the defendant an opportunity to dispose of h i s 
veh ic le . Uysb, 711 P.2d a t 269. I t i s important t o note the 
vehic le in UyjgJb was parked next t o a curb in a lawful parking 
area. Bygb, 711 P.2d a t 269. 
In Ste±£-X*-Bi££, 717 P.2d 695 (Utah 1986), the off icer 
suspected defendant of drug deal ing. When of f icers stopped 
defendant for a suspended l i cense the defendant pulled over and 
parked h i s truck off the s t r e e t in an office parking l o t . B±££, 
717 P.2d a t 696. The of f icers refused t o permit defendant t o 
leave h i s truck in the parkirg l o t or t o allow i t to be re t r i eved 
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by h i s parents . B±££i 717 P.2d a t 696. F ina l ly , the defendant 
was not advised of the search nor allowed to be present . B±££r 
717 P. 2d a t 696. 
In the ins tant case the fol lowing circumstances 
d i s t ingu i sh t h i s case from JJy.gb and JRi££ and j u s t i f y the 
impoundment of the v e h i c l e : (1) a t the time of defendant's 
a r r e s t , h i s car was parked in the middle of the parking l o t 
blocking t r a f f i c (R. 336); (2) the defendant was arrested for 
being under the inf luence of an opiate and thus could not drive 
the v e h i c l e (R. 395-96); (3) defendant did not have a d r i v e r 1 s 
l i c e n s e (R. 394); therefore , any further driving by the defendant 
would be i l l e g a l ; (4) defendant's fr iends were a l so arrested for 
being under the inf luence of o p i a t e s , thereby negating the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of one of them driving defendant's v e h i c l e ; (5) 
defendant had a temporary s t i cker from Utah in l i e u of l i c e n s e 
p l a t e s and was arrested at a motel which was evidence that 
defendant was l i k e l y passing through town without a permanent 
l o c a t i o n t o s tore h i s automobile; (6) unlike the defendant in Bd£S 
the defendant in the instant case did not ask the o f f i c e r s or 
suggest that h i s car be disposed of d i f f e r e n t l y ; (7) defendant was 
never denied the chance t o take valuables or personal property out 
of h i s car prior t o the inventory; (8) the o f f i c e r s impounded the 
v e h i c l e pursuant to Los Angeles Pol ice Department procedure and 
followed a mandatory c h e c k l i s t in the inventory of the car. 
These f a c t s , together with rat ional in ferences , 
considered in the l i g h t in which they appeared t o the o f f i c e r s , 
reasonably support the impoundment of defendant's automobile. 
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Defendant contends the o f f i c e r s 1 s top which l ed t o the 
subsequent inventory of the car was not j u s t i f i e d by surrounding 
circumstances but instead was a pretext t o search for s t o l e n 
property. Pretextual conduct occurs when po l i ce engage in a 
de l iberate scheme to evade the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment; 2agl3XS>X£-Xj*-Vl)lt£A-Stra±£S, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 
1961)* If a search i s v a l i d and reasonable, i t s v a l i d i t y i s not 
v i t i a t e d by a po l i ce o f f i c e r 1 s susp ic ion that contraband or other 
evidence may be found. Sid±£A_S±a&2£uX*-£±all£X, 616 F.2d 1284 
(5th Cir . 1980) . If the search i s i£&soi&bl£ and i s conducted 
according t o iQHtiL£^SOlis£^iQS£^iii£ an o f f i c e r 1 s suspic ion 
should have no bearing on i t s v a l i d i t y . The p o s s i b i l i t y that the 
searching o f f i c e r may have harbored a suspic ion that evidence of a 
criminal a c t i v i t y might be uncovered as a r e s u l t of the search 
should not v i t i a t e h i s o b l i g a t i o n t o conduct the inventory. 
£QM&JM£2l±}^X*-2iS3£Xax&9 363 N.E.2d 530 (Mass. App. 1977) . 
In the ins tant case the o f f i c e r s c l e a r l y were not 
operating under a pre text . The o f f i c e r s were rout ine ly 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e i r assigned area as part of a burglary and 
narcot i c s task force (R. 311) and stopped defendant's car because 
of the o f f i c e r s 1 observation and t h e i r reasonable be l i e f that the 
suspects were under the inf luence of a contro l l ed substance (R. 
323-27, 390 -96 ) . The o f f i c e r s f i r s t observed a woman with a slow, 
d e l i b e r a t e walk and droopy e y e l i d s enter defendant's car (R. 312-
13 , 3 9 0 ) . The o f f i c e r s determined she was under the inf luence of 
a contro l l ed substance (R. 395) . The o f f i c e r s next observed the 
two people who o f f i c e r s had j u s t seen administering drugs 
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intravenously approach defendant 's car (R. 315-18, 323, 391). 
F ina l ly , the of f icers approached the defendant in his car and 
observed fresh puncture wounds on defendant 's arras (R. 395) and 
noted defendant had slow, de l ibera te speech and movements (R. 
394). Clear ly, the off icers approached the vehicle and a r res ted 
the defendant because of the i r observations tha t the suspects were 
under the influence of a control led substance. Officers nei ther 
knew nor had reason to suspect that defendant 's car contained 
s to len property (R. 409) • 
Defendant next contends t ha t an impoundment was 
unnecessary as police could have l e f t defendant 's vehicle in the 
Pink Motel parking l o t . The following evidence c lear ly suggests 
tha t the opposite was t rue : (1) a t the time defendant was 
a r res ted h i s car was parked in the middle of the parking l o t 
blocking t r a f f i c , not in a parking s t a l l (R. 321, 336); (2) 
defendant did not have a d r i v e r ' s l i cense (R. 394) and was under 
the influence of drugs (R. 395), as were h is fr iends (R. 396), so 
neither defendant nor h is fr iends could l ega l ly move the car to a 
parking s t a l l ; (3) f i n a l l y , there i s no evidence tha t the motel 
manager would allow the car to stay in h i s l o t , the room occupied 
by defendant and the other suspects was only rented up to the day 
they were a r res ted (R. 425)• 
The circumstances surrounding the a r r e s t indica te the 
impoundment was not only j u s t i f i e d but was necessary. Once i t i s 
determined the impoundment was reasonable t h i s Court must 
determine whether the subsequent search was a val id inventory 
search. I t i s standard procedure in Los Angeles for of f icers t o 
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inventory an impounded v e h i c l e (R. 337) • A standardized inventory 
c h e c k l i s t met iculously o u t l i n e s the areas of an automobile where 
o f f i c e r s are required t o look (Defendant's Exhibit 1 , Addendum B ) . 
Standardized po l i ce procedure in t h i s context provides a guard 
against a r b i t r a r i n e s s or pre tex t . These regulat ions ensure that 
the po l i ce do only what i s necessary in the performance of the 
caretaking funct ion . Unlike the o f f i cer in Bysb, 711 P.2d a t 270, 
who did not fol low the regularized s e t of procedures for an 
inventory search, the o f f i c e r in the ins tant case completely 
searched the v e h i c l e , fol lowed a mandatory c h e c k l i s t in 
inventorying the v e h i c l e and made a l i s t of the items in the 
v e h i c l e (R. 336, Defendant's e x h i b i t 1 , Addendum B). 
Notwithstanding the standardized pract ice for 
inventorying impounded v e h i c l e s by Los Angeles po l i ce o f f i c e r s , 
defendant claims the o f f i c e r s ' search was unreasonable, in 
part icular the search under the hood and in the trunk. Defendant 
contends there was no i n d i c a t i o n that anything of value was 
located in the trunk nor did the o f f i c e r s ask defendant i f 
anything of value was located in the automobile. 
\ Although defendant argues the o f f i cer should ask the 
driver prior to the inventory of a v e h i c l e whether va luables or 
personal property are i n s i d e , the driver could l i e about or not 
r e c a l l the contents in h i s v e h i c l e . If po l i ce were to re ly on a 
d r i v e r ' s negat ive response as t o va luables or personal property 
wi th in the v e h i c l e , po l i ce could s t i l l be subject t o claims of 
t h e f t or l o s t property which belonged t o ind iv idua l s other than 
the dr iver . 
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In Stete-XjL-Eail
 9 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) , t h i s Court 
upheld the inventorying of a v e h i c l e ' s locked trunk pursuant t o 
impoundment. InEjailr a po l i ce o f f i cer stopped defendant's 
veh i c l e because defendant was weaving within h i s lane of t r a f f i c . 
Defendant presented h i s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e t o the o f f i c e r , but 
f a i l e d to produce a car r e g i s t r a t i o n . Subsequently/ defendant 
t r i e d t o run from the o f f i cer and was placed under custodial 
arres t for f a i l u r e to produce a r e g i s t r a t i o n or proof of ownership 
for the v e h i c l e . Off icers searched the ins ide of the car and 
found various drugs and a loaded gun. After the v e h i c l e was towed 
and impounded o f f i c e r s inventoried the v e h i c l e . Off icers opened 
the car trunk and found two large f sealed f green p l a s t i c garbage 
bags. The o f f i c e r s opened these bags and found a large quantity 
of marijuana. The Court upheld the warrantless search of the 
trunk as a v a l i d inventory search and c i t e d Els>li£&-3jL-l!X£X£r 466 
U.S. 380 (1984) f as support. 
In the ins tant case , o f f i c e r s opened the hood and trunk 
of defendant's veh i c l e pursuant t o a wr i t t en inventory c h e c k l i s t . 
(Defendant's Exhibit 1 ) . As in Sail, 716 P.2d 803, there i s no 
evidence o f f i c e r s asked defendant prior to taking the inventory 
whether there were valuables located in h i s v e h i c l e . The purpose 
t o look i n those areas was not only to determine whether valuables 
or personal property was secreted there , but a l s o to determine the 
type and condit ion of engine, battery , spare t i r e and jack, e t c . , 
contained there . Upon opening the hood, o f f i c e r s noted in p la in 
view a towel with the l e t t e r i n g "Pink Motel" printed thereon 
wrapped around a bulky object (R. 3 4 0 ) . The bundle was secured 
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next t o the engine by bungie cords. S imi lar ly , a small box with a 
cardboard cover with the l e t t e r i n g "Oakwood Jewelers , I n c . f Sa l t 
Lake Ci ty ," printed on the side was located in pla in view in the 
trunk (R. 342)• Neither object was locked nor sealed in any 
manner, as were the green p l a s t i c bags in JEail. Had not the 
o f f i c e r s inventoried the contents of the bundle under the hood and 
the unlocked box in the trunk, the po l i ce could have been l i a b l e 
for claims of l o s t or s t o l e n i tems. Indeed, Judge Russon1s 
ra t iona le for denying the motion t o suppress evidence obtained in 
the inventory search i s persuas ive: 
l i l t would appear to the Court that i t would 
be per fec t ly proper to open the trunk and to 
look in the trunk and make an inventory of 
the th ings that were there . . . . If you say 
there i s a box, then the next s tep i s what i s 
to prevent someone from saying, "Yes, I had 
diamonds in the box" or "I had gold bu l l ion 
in the box." Wouldn't the next normal s tep 
be t o open the l i d and look in t o make a 
l i t t l e inventory of that? (R. 434) 
Bi)±teA-S±al^Xj*-£ha&A£]ii 433 U.S. 1 (1977) , and 
AlkaJXSaS-y^San&SIS, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), c i t e d by defendant are 
inappl icable t o the f a c t s in t h i s case . Those cases involved an 
i l l e g a l search of locked s u i t c a s e s in trunks of cars a l l eged ly 
based upon probable cause, not inventory searches pursuant t o 
impoundment. In S±ate-X*-.Cxab±I££, 618 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah 1980) , 
t h i s Court d i s t ingui shed CJbi3.dtfi.cJj and SandsiS by s t a t i n g 
"In]e i ther dec i s ion addressed i t s e l f t o the searching of luggage 
as a po l i ce inventory procedure fo l lowing arres t on other 
charges ." 
Another case c i t e d by defendant, Uiui5d_Siai.e-S.-Y.* 
J0£llmD# 556 P.2d 442 (9th Cir . 1977) , i s d i s t ingu i shab le on i t s 
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f a c t s . In itellmajDr the court disal lowed the admission of evidence 
obtained from an inventory search for two reasons: (1) the 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r t e s t i f i e d that the reason he inventoried the 
v e h i c l e was because he was searching for evidence f and (2) 
inventory searches had not been a normal caretaking pract ice in 
the Eugene Pol ice Department. ItellmajJr 556 F.2d a t 444. In the 
case at bar, there i s no evidence of invest igatory motive. 
Off icers had no reason to be l i eve s to len property was in 
defendant's v e h i c l e (R. 4 0 9 ) . Further, an inventory search of an 
impounded v e h i c l e i s a normal and required pract ice in the Los 
Angeles Pol ice Department (R. 3 3 6 ) . 
F ina l ly , defendant argues that po l i ce should not have 
s e i z e d the jewelry found in the car and conducted an 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Such a proposi t ion would encourage po l i ce to look 
the other way when they come across susp ic ious , p o t e n t i a l l y 
incriminating evidence while undertaking an inventory search. 
Off icers were j u s t i f i e d in s e i z i n g the jewelry at the very l e a s t 
to protect themselves against claims of l o s t or s to len property in 
case the jewelry had been l e f t in the car. Further, the fact that 
jewelry was located under the hood and the box in the trunk had a 
jewelry s t o r e ' s name and o u t - o f - s t a t e address printed on the side 
would create reasonable suspic ion in a po l i ce o f f i c e r ' s mind t o 
follow up with an i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
Clearly , the o f f i c e r s in the ins tant case were act ing 
wi th in the ir scope of authority and in response to standard 
departmental policy* No invasion of defendant's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r igh t s occurred. 
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B. THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANTS VEHICLE 
WAS JUSTIFIED BECAUSE OFFICERS 
HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE 
THE VEHICLE CONTAINED CONTRABAND. 
Pol ice o f f i c e r s who have l e g i t i m a t e l y stopped a v e h i c l e 
and who have probable cause to b e l i e v e that contraband i s 
concealed somewhere within i t may conduct a warrant less search of 
containers wi th in the v e h i c l e that are not within p la in view. 
Uld££d-S±air£3-X*-RD££, 4 56 U.S. 798 (1982) . S££ 3lSQ Uixi±£d 
Ste±£3-y*-JS>bD&, U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 881 (1985); £aiIS>ll-X* 
United-States* 267 U.S. 132 (1925) . Given the nature of an 
automobile in t r a n s i t such a search i s necessary i f po l i ce 
o f f i c e r s are t o secure the contraband in the automobile, Bs>SS§ 456 
U.S. a t 806. Prior to a warrantless search o f f i c e r s must make a 
probable cause determination based on objec t ive f a c t s that could 
j u s t i f y the issuance of a warrant by a magis trate . BQ339 4 56 U.S. 
at 808. 
This Court has o f ten upheld warrant less searches of 
v e h i c l e s and the containers there in when o f f i c e r s have probable 
cause t o b e l i e v e the v e h i c l e contains contraband. S££ £±g± $Xate 
X*-3&ll, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) (probable cause to continue the 
search of defendant's rented automobile ex i s t ed whenf in a 
preliminary search of the passenger compartment, an o f f i c e r found 
strong a i r fresheners , a loaded firearm, and a quantity of 
contro l l ed substances and drug paraphernalia); Stete-Xjt-&£l&# 665 
P.2d 1317 (Utah 1983) (the search of defendant's car was 
reasonable and lawful s ince he was a parolee and shotgun s h e l l s 
were in open v iew); S±ate-X*-33ll£Db£ig£I, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 
1982) (considering the l a t e n e s s of the hour, the defendant's 
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suspic ious movements, the o f f i c e r s 1 knowledge of the high rate of 
burglary i n the area and unobstructed view of a CB radio in the 
defendant's car, the o f f i c e r s had probable cause t o search the 
defendant's automobile); SX&±&-2*-Ba3&ns>n&9 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 
P.2d 276 (1976) (where an o f f i cer observes property that he has 
reason to b e l i e v e i s s t o l e n the protect ion against unreasonable 
searches does not prevent him from further searching the immediate 
area for more s to len property) . 
In the ins tant case the o f f i cer had probable cause t o 
be l i eve defendant's v e h i c l e contained contraband. Defendant was 
parked a t a l o c a t i o n where drug t ra f f i ck ing had been known t o 
occur (R. 311) . Upon stopping defendant. Officer Figueroa 
observed a marijuana c i g a r e t t e in the ashtray (R. 395 ) . Off icers 
a l so observed fresh track marks on defendant's arms, and defendant 
had slow de l ibera te speech and movements. Off icers concluded from 
the ir observat ions that defendant was under the influence of an 
opiate (R. 3 94 ) . 
£hai3tfIff*9 433 U.S. 1 , and SanSsiS, 442 U.S. 753 , 
previously c i t ed by defendant are inappl icable to the present 
case . In £lxe.dtfi.ffJs and S3L&SIS the o f f i c e r s had probable cause t o 
search luggage prior t o the placement of the luggage in an 
automobile. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the contraband and the 
v e h i c l e was purely co inc identa l . Boss, 456 U.S. a t 8134 c i t i n g 
Saiti£I3, 442 U.S. at 766-767. 
In the ins tant case the o f f i c e r s had probable cause t o 
search the e n t i r e v e h i c l e for contraband. The scope of the 
warrantless search cf an automobile i s defined by the object of 
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the search and the p laces in which there i s probable cause t o 
b e l i e v e that i t may be found. B&JB3, 456 U.S. 824. Thus, the 
search of the trunk and the hood and the containers wi th in such 
p laces was j u s t i f i e d by the o f f i c e r s ' probable cause to b e l i e v e 
defendant's v e h i c l e contained contraband. 
JEDIfiX-JJ 
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
Defendant claims that the evidence presented against 
him a t t r i a l was i n s u f f i c i e n t to support h i s convic t ion of 
aggravated a s s a u l t . S p e c i f i c a l l y defendant a l l e g e s : (1) ne i ther 
of the two wi tnesses ins ide the jewelry s tore a t the time of the 
robbery i d e n t i f i e d defendant as one of the perpetrators; (2) 
because defendant may have committed or aided in the commission of 
the robbery, defendant did not neces sar i ly commit an aggravated 
a s s a u l t . 
The standard a r t i c u l a t e d by t h i s Court for reviewing a 
chal lenge to the s u f f i c i e n c y of evidence i s that the evidence and 
a l l reasonable inferences drawn therefrom w i l l be viewed in a 
l i g h t most favorable to the j u r y ' s verd ic t and to s e t as ide a jury 
v e r d i c t , the evidence must be " s u f f i c i e n t l y inconclus ive or so 
inherent ly improbable that reasonable minds must have enterta ined 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he was convicted." S±a±£-2t*-B£b£t£iaiXDi 681 P.2d 1265, 1256 (Utah 
1984); Sta±£-Xjt-G3X£13i 663 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 1983) . Moreover, i t 
i s the exc lus ive province of the jury t o judge the c r e d i b i l i t y of 
the w i t n e s s e s and the weight of the evidence. £±3Jt£_Yj^iJjC».£llt 
649 P.2d 91 , 97 (Utah 1982) . 
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When viewed in a l i g h t most favorable t o the v e r d i c t , 
the evidence introduced a t t r i a l was s u f f i c i e n t to support 
defendant's convict ion for aggravated a s s a u l t . 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-102 (197 8) provides t h a t : 
(1) Assault i s : 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or 
v io l ence , to do bodily injury t o another; 
or 
(b) A threat , accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or v i o l e n c e , to do bodily 
injury to another. 
(2) Assault i s a c l a s s B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978) provides t h a t : 
(1) A person commits aggravated a s s a u l t i f he 
commits a s s a u l t as defined in s ec t ion 76-5-102 
and: 
(a) He i n t e n t i o n a l l y causes ser ious bodily 
injury to another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means 
or force l i k e l y to produce death or ser ious 
bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated a s s a u l t i s a felony of the 
third degree. 
The fol lowing a r t i c u l a b l e f a c t s support the j u r y ' s 
f inding that defendant committed the aggravated a s sau l t against 
S t e l l a Kyarsguard: (1) several wi tnesses i d e n t i f i e d defendant 
Johnson's automobile as being the v e h i c l e which two "suspicious" 
looking men carrying a large , f u l l garbage bag jumped in to and 
quickly departed from the parking l o t (R. 1097, 1136); (2) much of 
the jewelry s t o l e n during the robbery was found in defendant's 
automobile (R. 890-910); (3) a t the time of the robbery, Daniel 
Will iams, a customer in a nearby restaurant, saw two men walk 
towards Oakwood Jewelers and approximately ten minutes l a t e r , he 
saw the same two men walk back towards the parking l o t , the 
shorter man i d e n t i f i e d as Paul Branch and the t a l l e r man 
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i d e n t i f i e d as Raymond Johnsonr the defendant (R. 1192); (4) while 
s i t t i n g in the ir car in the parking l o t , Mrs. Wright and her 
daughter, Misty, not iced two menf one t a l l e r than the other, 
carrying a f u l l p l a s t i c garbage bag t o a wai t ing , running car 
which matched the descr ipt ion of the car belonging t o Raymond 
Johnson, and they i d e n t i f i e d the two men as Paul Branch and 
Raymond Johnson (R. 1088, 1139); (5) the gun found in the room 
where defendant, was s taying in Cal i fornia was i d e n t i f i e d by 
Joanne Knaphus as the same gun used in the robbery of Oakwood 
Jewelers (R. 652) . 
Defendant's contention that neither of the two 
wi tnes se s ins ide the jewelry s tore a t the time of the robbery 
i d e n t i f i e d defendant as one of the perpetrators i s dece iv ing . 
S t e l l a Kyarsguard did not c l e a r l y see the man who threatened her 
with the gun; there fore , i t was impossible for her to i d e n t i f y the 
defendant as that person. The man with the gun repeatedly t o l d 
the women not to look a t h i s face (R. 1221) and they both obeyed 
h i s order. S imi lar ly , although Joanne Knaphus i d e n t i f i e d Allen 
Johnson, the defendant's brother, as the man with the gun, she too 
admitted that she did not ge t a good look a t h i s face (R. 643) . 
The defendant next contends that the S ta te blended the 
offense of aggravated robbery with aggravated a s s a u l t . Defendant 
argues that although defendant may have committed or aided in the 
commission of a robbery, defendant did not neces sar i ly commit an 
aggravated a s s a u l t . 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-202 (1953) , as amended, extends 
criminal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and l i a b i l i t y t o any party t o a criminal 
of fense as f o l l o w s : 
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Every person, act ing with the mental s t a t e 
required for the commission of an offense 
who d i r e c t l y commits the of fense , who 
s o l i c i t s , requests , commands, encouragesr 
or i n t e n t i o n a l l y aids another person t o 
engage in conduct which c o n s t i t u t e s an 
offense sha l l be criminal ly l i a b l e as a 
party for such conduct. 
Also , Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-307 (1953) , as amended, does not 
r e l i e v e a pr inc ip le or a party to an offense (as defined in § 76-
2-202) from criminal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y unless prior to the commission 
of the o f fense , he vo luntar i ly terminates h i s e f for t to promote or 
f a c i l i t a t e i t s commission and e i ther g ive s t imely warning t o the 
proper law enforcement a u t h o r i t i e s or the intended v i c t im, or 
wholly deprives h i s prior e f f o r t s of e f f e c t i v e n e s s in the 
commission of the o f fense . 
In SJtaiiLY^lluxpby, 26 Utah 2d 33 0, 4 89 P. 2d 43 0 
(1971), two men, Murphy and Jordan, drove to a s tore in Sa l t Lake 
Ci ty . Jordan went in to the s tore to commit a robbery while Murphy 
waited outs ide in h i s parked, running car. During the robbery, 
Jordan k i l l e d a man then reentered Murphy's car and both drove to 
another nearby car. At t r i a l two wi tnesses i d e n t i f i e d Murphy as 
one of the two men in the car. In upholding the j u r y ' s g u i l t y 
v e r d i c t , t h i s Court reasoned: 
We agree that in order to j u s t i f y the 
convict ion of murder in the f i r s t degree for 
the homicide which resul ted in the 
perpetration of the robbery . . . , the 
evidence must j u s t i f y the jury be l i ev ing and 
f inding beyond a reasonable doubt, • • • , 
that the defendant was aware of Jordan's 
purpose and thus had the in tent to 
p a r t i c i p a t e in the robbery as a pr inc ipa l . 
The converse i s a l so true: If the evidence 
did so j u s t i f y such f ind inc , then the 
defendant, in so par t i c ipat ing in the robbery 
as a pr inc ipa l , was responsible for the 
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USAUXAL and viobablS-S&ikBGSiusnses that 
occurred in the robbery, including the 
homicide which resul ted there in even though 
he did not so personally p a r t i c i p a t e in the 
k i l l i n g [ c i t a t i o n s omitted] [emphasis added]• 
JUxrjfthyr 489 P.2d a t 431. 
Under the HurjpJby ra t iona le , the driver who waited in 
the car i s presumed culpable for the natural and probable 
consequences that occur during the time of the aggravated robbery. 
If a murder i s a natural and probable consequence of an armed 
robbery as in Hurphyr surely an aggravated a s s a u l t of a customer 
who walked in a store during an armed robbery would a lso be 
natural and probable. Therefore, even i f defendant was not in the 
store but was the driver of the car a t the time of the robbery, he 
would s t i l l be accountable for the aggravated a s s a u l t of S t e l l a 
Kyarsguard. 
The S ta te recognizes that the Hurphy case was decided 
under Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-44 (1953) which was replaced in 1973 
by the current s t a t u t e , § 76 -2 -202 . However, in £Jta±jeLy^_jS±mper 
554 P.2d 1332, 1333 (Utah 1976) , t h i s Court, in comparing the old 
s t a t u t e , S 7 6 - 1 - 4 4 , with the new one, S 76 -2 -202 , s ta ted : 
Though not i d e n t i c a l in wording, there i s no 
e s s e n t i a l d i f ference between them. Under 
e i ther [ s t a t u t e ] , a party may be found g u i l t y 
as a principal to a crime i f she s o l i c i t e d , 
requested, encouraged, aided or abetted 
another in i t s commission. 
JSjdxupgf 554 P.2d a t 1333. 
No fewer than three wi tnes ses p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d 
defendant Raymond Johnson as one of the two men a t or near the 
scene of the armed robbery :R. 1088, 1187-88, 1138-39) . His 
companion, Paul Branch, who was a l s o i d e n t i f i e d as one of the men 
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by these same t h r e e w i t n e s s e s , was a l s o i d e n t i f i e d a s one of the 
p e r p e t r a t o r s of t he robbery of Oakwood Jewe le r s by S t e l l a 
Kyarsguard (R. 1227-28) . 
The ju ry was not o b l i g a t e d t o b e l i e v e t h e evidence a t 
t r i a l which was most f avo rab le to defendant* S£a££-X*-B£N£ll, 649 
P.2d 9 1 , 97 (Utah 1982) . Fur thermore, when t h e r e i s c o n f l i c t i n g 
ev idence , t he Utah Supreme Court i s "ob l i ga t ed t o accep t t h a t 
v e r s i o n of t h e f a c t s which suppor t s t h e v e r d i c t . " Ijfl. a t 9 3 . 
There fore , t he j u ry need not have be l i eved the tes t imony most 
f avo rab l e t o defendant ; and t h e reviewing c o u r t must accept t h e 
v e r s i o n of t he f a c t s which s u p p o r t s t he v e r d i c t . 
JDJUT- J J J 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY REGARDING POSSESSION OF 
STOLEN PROPERTY SINCE THE INSTRUCTION 
WAS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND 
MAINTAINED THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE 
STATE. 
Defendant c la ims j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n 19 i s a l e g a l l y 
i n c o r r e c t s ta tement of t he law and u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s h i f t s t h e 
burden of proof from the S t a t e t o t h e defendant . The i n s t r u c t i o n 
informed the j u ry t h a t : 
Under the law of the S t a t e of Utah, 
possess ion of p roper ty r e c e n t l y s t o l e n , 
when a person in possess ion f a i l s t o make 
a s a t i s f a c t o r y e x p l a n a t i o n of such pos-
s e s s i o n , i s a f ac t from which you may 
i n f e r t h a t the person in possess ion s t o l e 
such p r o p e r t y . 
Defendant concedes t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t he 
d o c t r i n e embodied i n Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1978), which 
s t a t e s : 
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Possess ion of property recently s t o l e n , 
when no s a t i s f a c t o r y explanation of such 
possess ion i s made, sha l l be deemed prima 
f a c i e evidence that the person in pos-
s e s s i o n s t o l e the property* 
In S±a±£-yj*-Gl3X£S, 717 P.2d 717 (Utah 1986) , t h i s Court recent ly 
reaffirmed the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of S 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 2 ( 1 ) . Quoting 3£ID£3 
X+-Vld±eaL.S±a±££i 412 O.S 837, 839-40 (1973), t h i s Court 
recognized the deeply embedded common law t r a d i t i o n embodied in 
t h i s doctr ine: 
[ P o s s e s s i o n of recent ly s t o l e n property 
i f not s a t i s f a c t o r i l y explained, i s 
ordinari ly a circumstance from which you 
may reasonably draw the infsi£L££ and f ind , 
in the l i g h t of the surrounding circumstan-
ces shown by the evidence in the case , that 
the person in possess ion knew the property 
had been s t o l e n , [emphasis added] 
CxsyjELSr 717 P.2d a t 718. 
In quest ioning the v a l i d i t y of the jury ins t ruc t ion as 
an accurate descr ipt ion of the law, the defendant focuses on the 
word " fa i l" in the jury ins truc t ion as opposed t o the word "no" in 
the s t a t u t e , S 76 -6 -402 (1 ) . S imi lar ly , the defendant compares the 
word "infer" in the jury ins truc t ion with "prima fac i e" in § 7 6 - 6 -
402(1) , claiming that in fer has the capacity to create a more 
powerful presumption of g u i l t of the defendant. 
The defendant o f fers no l e g a l authority to support h i s 
argument. This Court should refuse to rule on points on appeal 
when no l e g a l authority or a n a l y s i s has been of fered. States* 
toi£QB£, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984) . 
Assuming defendant had supported h i s argument with 
l e g a l authori ty , defendant's attempt t o d i s t ingu i sh the jury 
i n s t r u c t i o n and S 76-6-402(1) i s not persuas ive . F i r s t , the word 
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• f a i l s " in the jury ins truct ion and "no" in S 76-6-402(1) should 
be compared in the context of the phrases they are embodied i n ; 
not ind iv idua l ly as in defendant's a n a l y s i s . The phrase "when no 
s a t i s f a c t o r y explanation of such possess ion i s given", 
S 76 -6 -402 (1 ) , compared t o "when a person in possess ion f a i l s to 
make a s a t i s f a c t o r y explanation of such posses s ion ," are so 
s imi lar , the i r meanings are undist inguishable . In the context of 
both phrases, " f a i l s " and "no" possess the same meaning. 
S imi lar ly , defendant's attempt t o d i s t ingu i sh "infer" 
and "prima fac ie" i s not persuasive . In S£a£r£-2/*-Gl2X££# 717 P.2d 
717 (Utah 1986) , t h i s Court, in paraphrasing § 76 -6 -402 (1 ) , s tated 
the fo l lowing: 
Such f a i l u r e to explain h i s possess ion r a i s e s 
an iD££iSB££ that he knew the property was 
s t o l e n . U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-402(1) 
a r t i c u l a t e s t h i s general principal [ s ta tute 
omitted] [emphasis added] 
Cx.aY.ejS, 717 P.2d a t 717. Furthermore, the use of the word "infer" 
does not necessar i ly create a more powerful presumption than the 
word "prima fac i e" , s ince the v a l i d i t y of the inference depends 
upon there being a rat ional connection between the proven and the 
inferred f a c t . T£t^y^VDdt£j3uStat££f 319 U.S. 463, 467-6 8 (1943). 
The defendant next contends that in s t ruc t ion 19 
uncons t i tu t iona l ly s h i f t s the burden of proof from the State to 
the defendant. The Sta te does not contest the uncons t i tu t iona l i ty 
of jury i n s t r u c t i o n s in criminal cases which s h i f t the burden of 
proof to the defendant. This Court has frequently remanded cases 
for new t r i a l s when t r i a l courts have permitted jury i n s t r u c t i o n s 
which create a mandatory rebuttable presumption of g u i l t of the 
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defendant. £lat£^^Cbsmi>SI3$ 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985); S±aJt£_X* 
2a£b&£S>9 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985) ( cer t , pending); States* 
JaXAfAf 36 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 P.2d , (June 30 f 1986 ) . 
Such i n s t r u c t i o n s uncons t i tu t iona l ly s h i f t the burden of proof to 
the defendant. 
The jury ins truc t ion in the ins tant case does not f i t 
wi th in the £b3®b£i3t £a£b££& or Taisla ru l ings for two reasons. 
F i r s t , jury ins truc t ion 19 i s not verbatim of S 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 2 ( 1 ) . 
Second, the ins truc t ion does not create a mandatory presumption, 
but a permissive inference . This Court has determined that the 
language in S 76-6-402(1) , m£b3ll-b£-&££JR£3 prima f a c i e evidence," 
when used verbatim in a jury ins t ruc t ion , crea tes a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption. However, the language in jury i n s t r u c t i o n 
19 , "msy^ i n f e r , " does not create a mandatory rebuttable 
presumption. The United S ta te s Supreme Court in EiancisSjt 
JlADJfliD, U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985) , recognized a 
d i s t i n c t d i f ference between mandatory and permissive presumptions 
in the context of jury i n s t r u c t i o n s : 
"The threshold inquiry in ascer ta in ing the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ana lys i s appl icable to t h i s 
kind of jury ins t ruc t ion i s to determine the 
nature of the presumption i t de scr ibes ." 
[ c i t a t i o n s omitted] The court must determine 
whether the challenged port ion of the 
i n s t r u c t i o n crea te s a mandatory presumption, 
or merely a permissive inference . [ c i t a t i o n s 
omitted] A mandatory presumption i n s t r u c t s 
the jury that i t must infer the presumed fac t 
i f the State proves certa in predicate f a c t s , 
[ footnote omitted] A permissive inference 
suggests to the jury a poss ib le conclusion t o 
2 Webster's New Internat ional Dictionary 1396 (3rd ed. 1971), 
def ines fmay" as "have permission t o . " 
- 2 8 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be drawn i f the State proves predicate f a c t s , 
but does not require the jury to draw that 
conclus ion. 
Mandatory presumptions must be measured 
against the standards of Hiixslxip as 
e lucidated in SanAsiiom• Such presumptions 
v i o l a t e the Due Process Clause i f they 
r e l i e v e the State of the burden of persuasion 





Ih£-£QB££IRS-Q£S3n£££lQm• [emphasis added] 
IX3&£i£r supra at 1971. Since the language in in s t ruc t ion 19 was 
c l e a r l y permissive in nature, the burden of proof remained with 
the S t a t e ; therefore , the jury ins t ruc t ion must be upheld as va l id 
and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . In addi t ion , the t r i a l court in the instant 
case c l e a r l y ins tructed the jury that the State has the burden of 
proof in several other jury ins truc t ions (Addendum C). 
JBIKLiy 
THEFT IS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY UNDER THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE. 
Prior to t r i a l , defendant f i l e d a motion t o dismiss the 
thef t count contained in the information, contending that the f t 
was a l e s s e r included offense of aggravated robbery under £.tai£_Y.A 
JLillr 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983) . In response, the prosecutor, 
apparently in an e f f o r t to avoid the holding of B i l l , argued that 
the f t was not a l e s s e r included offense in t h i s case because the 
information a l l e g e d that Joanne Knaphus, the s tore c lerk , was the 
v ict im of the aggravated robbery and Oakwood Jewelers , the s tore , 
was the v i c t im of the t h e f t . The prosecution a l t e r n a t i v e l y argued 
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that because second degree felony the f t—as i t was charged in t h i s 
case—requires proof that the property s t o l e n had a value in 
excess of $1,000 (see Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-412(1) (a) ( i ) (1978) , 
an element that need not be proved for aggravated robbery, t h i s 
v a r i a t i o n of t h e f t i s not a l e s s e r included offense of aggravated 
robbery under the holding of JBJJJ. Although i t i s not 
par t i cu lar ly c lear from the record, the t r i a l court apparently 
agreed that the prosecutor's dual v ic t im theory d i s t ingui shed 
d e f e n d a n t s case from B i l l and denied the motion t o d i smiss . On 
appeal, defendant claims that t h i s rul ing was erroneous. 
Although both of the prosecutor ' s t h e o r i e s for 
d i s t ingu i sh ing t h i s case f rom B i l l may be v a l i d , i t i s not 
necessary t o d i scuss them, or the t r i a l c o u r t ' s re l iance on a t 
l e a s t one of them, in reso lv ing the i s sue defendant presents . I t 
i s we l l s e t t l e d that t h i s Court may affirm a dec i s ion on any 
proper ground "even though the t r i a l court ass igned another reason 
for i t s r u l i n g . " S±a±£-XjL-3lX3&, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985) . 
Here, the t r i a l court presumably analyzed defendant's motion t o 
dismiss under the holding of H i l l which r e l i e d on Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-402(3) (1978). However, a UJ11 a n a l y s i s was not appropriate 
under the circumstances. This case involved, in a l ega l sense , 
two d i s t i n c t a c t s by defendant, committed within a s ing le criminal 
episode—one cons t i tu ted aggravated robbery and the other t h e f t . 
Whether a g r e a t e r - l e s s e r of fense r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s in a 
part icu lar case , under e i ther H i l l or £±a±£_Y*-JRak£Xr 671 P.2d 152 
(Utah 1983) (which s e t s forth the t e s t to determine whether a 
defendant i s e n t i t l e d t o a requested l e s s e r included of fense 
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i n s t r u c t i o n ) , i s an i ssue .only where a s ing l e act of the defendant 
i s involved. For example, in a criminal homicide case the 
quest ion may be whether the defendant's s i n g l e act of k i l l i n g 
cons t i tu ted second degree murder or manslaughter (a l e s s e r 
included offense of second degree murder). If the defendant had 
committed two a c t s of k i l l i n g within a s i n g l e criminal episode, 
one c o n s t i t u t i n g second degree murder and the other manslaughter, 
the defendant could not succes s fu l l y argue that , because the two 
of fenses f a l l within the g r e a t e r - l e s s e r offense re la t i onsh ip , he 
could be convicted of only one of fense . I t i s c lear that i f "the 
crimes were a re su l t of separate and d i s t i n c t a c t s that resul ted 
in separate and d i s t i n c t crimes," a defendant may be convicted and 
sentenced for each of the of fenses ar i s ing out of a s i n g l e 
criminal episode . J5Jtja±JBLJTji-JDL!Bjf-iejJf 37 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 , 4 , 
P.2d , (1986) . 3££ SlSQ £&t£-XjL-JS>liX&£, 712 P.2d 843 
(Utah 1986); S±a±£-2t*-2£>lt£I, 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) . 
In defendant's case , the evidence e s tab l i shed that 
defendant and a companion, who were armed with guns, entered a 
jewelry s tore where one of them threatened the clerk with the gun 
and took her and locked her in a back room. Either defendant or 
h i s companion then removed jewelry from the showcase. Based upon 
t h i s criminal episode, defendant was charged with aggravated 
robbery and t h e f t . 3 At t r i a l , the court gave the jury the 
fo l lowing i n s t r u c t i o n s regarding those o f f enses : 
3
 As noted e a r l i e r in t h i s br ief , defendant was a l s o charged with 
and convicted of aggravated a s s a u l t . However, that count i s not 
pert inent t o the issue discussed in t h i s point . 
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In£±LU££iS>R-BjD±-2& 
Each defendant has been charged by Count I of 
the Information in t h i s case with v i o l a t i o n of a 
s ta tu te which provides, in part pert inent t o t h i s 
case , as f o l l o w s : 
"• • • a person commits Aggravated 
Robbery i f in the course of committing 
robbery, he. • . uses a firearm or a 
facs imi l e of a firearm. • . or a deadly 
weapon. . ." 
"• . . for the purpose of t h i s part , 
an act shal l be deemed to be in the 
course of committing a robbery i f i t 
occurs in an attempt to commit, during 
the commission of, or the immediate 
f l i g h t after the attempt or commission 
of a robbery." 
(R. 189) 
lnstiuetiQn-BDjL-21 
A re la ted s t a t u t e provides, in part pert inent 
t o t h i s case , a s f o l l o w s : 
"• . . Robbery i s the unlawful 
and in tent iona l taking of personal 
property from the possess ion of another 
from his person, or immediate presence, 
against h i s w i l l , accompanied by means 
of force or f ear ." 
(R. 190) 
The elements of Robbery, as they relate to this 
case, are; 
1. The taking of personal property from another 
person; and 
2. The possession or immediate presence of such 
other person of said property; and 
3. The taking of such property against the will 
of such other person; and 
4. The accomplishment of such taking by means of 
force or fear; and 
5. Such taking being then and there unlawful: 
6. Such taking being then and there intentional. 
(R. 191) 
InstiustiQR-Es) L-25. 
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*ach defendant has been charged by Count I I I of the 
Information in t h i s case with v i o l a t i o n of a s t a t u t e which 
provides , in part pert inent t o t h i s case , as f o l l ows : 
"A person commits the f t i f he obtains 
or exerc i s e s unlawful control over the 
property of another with the purpose t o 
deprive him thereof*m 
(R. 195) 
Ins£zu£tis>ik-EjD±-lIz 
Before you can convict the defendant, Raymond 
Jef frey Johnson, of the crime of Aggravated Robbery as 
charged in Count I of the Information on f i l e in t h i s 
case , you must b e l i e v e from a l l of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the 
fo l lowing elements of that of fense: 
1 . That on or about the 18th day of August, 
1984, wi thin the corporate l i m i t s of Sa l t Lake 
County, the defendant, Raymond Jef frey Johnson, 
e i ther attempted or committed or f l ed from the 
attempt or commission of a robbery of Joanne Knaphus 
or s o l i c i t e d or requested or commanded or encouraged 
or i n t e n t i o n a l l y aided another person or other persons 
to engage in the commission of said robbery of Joanne 
Knaphus; and 
2 . That said defendant then and there e i ther 
used or s o l i c i t e d or requested or commanded or 
encouraged or i n t e n t i o n a l l y aided another person or 
other persons to use a deadly weapon; and 
3 . That said defendant then and there did so 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y or knowingly. 
If, after careful considerat ion of a l l of the 
evidence in t h i s case , you are not convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing 
elements, then you must f ind the defendant, Raymond 
Jef frey Johnson not g u i l t y of Count I . If, on the 
other hand, you are convinced of the truth of each 
and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt then you must f ind the defendant, 
Raymond Jef frey Johnson, g u i l t y of Aggravated 
Robbery as charged in Count I of the Information 
on f i l e in t h i s case . 
(R. 205-06) 
InstiuctiQiL-EDjL-AQ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Raymond 
Jef frey Johnson, of the crime of Theft as charged 
in Count I I I of the Information on f i l e in t h i s 
case , you must b e l i e v e from a l l of the evidence 
and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every 
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one of the fo l lowing elements of that o f fense; 
1 . That on or about the 18th day of Augustf 
1984, within the corporate l i m i t s of Sa l t Lake 
County, the defendant Raymond Jef frey Johnsonr 
e i t h e r : 
a. Obtained or exerc ised unauthorized 
control over property; or 
b. S o l i c i t e d or requested or 
commanded or encouraged or aided 
another or others in obtaining 
or exerc i s ing unauthorized control 
over such property; and 
2. That said defendant did so i n t e n t i o n a l l y or 
knowingly; and 
3 . That said property then and there belonged 
t o Oakwood Jewelry; and 
4 . That said defendant then and there had a 
purpose to deprive another; and 
5 . That said property then and there had a 
value in excess of $1 ,000 .00 . 
If f a f ter careful cons iderat ion of a l l of the 
evidence in t h i s case r you are not convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing 
elements, then you must f ind the defendant, Raymond 
Jef frey Johnson, not g u i l t y of Count I I I . If , on 
the other hand, you are convinced of the truth of each 
and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must f ind the defendant, 
Raymond Je f frey Johnson, g u i l t y of Theft as charged 
in Count I I I of the Information on f i l e in t h i s case . 
(R. 215-16) 
These i n s t r u c t i o n s made c lear to the jurors tha t , in order t o 
convict defendant of aggravated robbery, they need only f ind that 
defendant used a deadly weapon in an 3ii£fl)Pt to commit a robbery; 
and, an attempted robbery, of course, would not require a f inding 
that property had been taken. "A person i s g u i l t y of an attempt 
to commit a crime i f , ac t ing with the kind of c u l p a b i l i t y 
otherwise required for the commission of the o f fense , he engages 
in conduct c o n s t i t u t i n g a subs tant ia l s t ep toward commission of 
the o f f ense ." Utah Code Ann. S 76-4-101(1) (1978) . This means 
that , t o be g u i l t y of an a t t e n p t , a defendant roust possess the 
mental s t a t e required for commission of the o f fense . JS.tfl.t£_JL* 
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Haje.S£3.Sr 652 P.2d 903f 904 (Utah 1982). Andr on the quest ion of 
what cons t i t u t e s a subs tan t ia l s tep toward commission of the 
offense, t h i s Court has observed: 
The [attempt] s t a t u t e adopts the def in i t ion 
of an "attempt" employed in the Model Penal 
Code, S 5 .01 , purposed on drawing the l i n e 
further away from the f inal act and enlarging 
the common law concept. I t emphasizes what the 
accused has done, not what remains t o be done. 
S£at£^2tj>-2£3I£S>D, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1984) (footnote 
omit ted) . Under these standards, i t i s c lear tha t defendant 
committed aggravated robbery the moment he entered the jewelry 
s t o r e . 3JSS EsaiSQll (holding tha t evidence was suf f ic ien t t o 
support conviction of attempted burglary and robbery where 
defendant was stopped and ar res ted while driving t o the locat ion 
where he planned to commit the offenses) . In short , defendant 's 
ac t ions , prior to the actual taking of the jewelry, es tabl ished an 
attempt to commit a robbery, and his use of a deadly weapon 
converted t ha t attempt in to aggravated robbery. That the robbery 
was subsequently completed i s of no consequence; a finding of an 
attempt would s t i l l be poss ib le . £££, £ ^ r 3Xa±£L-X*-Giall£aQ31 
193 Neb. 651, 228 N.W.2d 615 (1975); Li<2h£££>0±-X*-S±a±£, 278 Md. 
231, 360 A.2d 426 (1976); Perkins and Boyce, £ximinal_Law 612 (3d 
ed. 1982). Thus, i t does not matter whether the jury found a 
completed robbery or an attempted robbery. If the jury found a 
completed robbery, i t necessar i ly found an attempt to commit tha t 
crime—the necessary element of aggravated robbery tha t the Sta te 
i s re lying upon in t h i s case. 
For the addi t ional and d i s t i n c t act of taking the jewelry, 
defendant could va l id ly be convicted of t he f t , which requires that 
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the actor "obtain! ] or e x e r c i s e ! ] unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof ." Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978) . Therefore, a f ter a c lose examination 
of the manner i n which defendant was charged and the i n s t r u c t i o n s 
t o the jury, i t i s c lear that the t r i a l c o u r t ' s denial of 
defendant's motion t o dismiss can be j u s t i f i e d on the " d i s t i n c t 
act" a n a l y s i s s e t forth above. Accordingly, t h i s Court should 
affirm defendant's conv ic t ions for both aggravated robbery and 
t h e f t . Sse DlBiisiM J i? l i¥£ i ; 2S>L£SI. 
£SWCU3SJDS 
The search of defendant's v e h i c l e was reasonable and 
the t r i a l c o u r t ' s denial of defendant's motion t o suppress the 
evidence should be affirmed. In addi t ion , the j u r y ' s verd ic t as 
t o the charge of aggravated a s s a u l t should be upheld s ince a 
reasonable man could have reached the same verd ic t beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the t r i a l court correc t ly 
ins tructed the jury regarding recent ly s to len property s ince the 
i n s t r u c t i o n was permissive not mandatory and the burden of proof 
remained on the S t a t e . F ina l ly , under the f a c t s of t h i s case 
t h e f t i s not a l e s s e r included offense of aggravated robbery s ince 
the t h e f t and aggravated robbery were two separate a c t s wi th in a 
s i n g l e criminal episode. The State seeks aff irmation of the 
v e r d i c t and judgment of the lower court as t o aggravated robbery 
aggravated a s s a u l t , and t h e f t . 
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DATED this jl£L day of July, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
"t&Jxy.g '^*&bu*tSf' 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK 
Ass i s tant Attorney General 
£J^iflJCAT£_QJ_MJLJ.NG 
I hereby c e r t i f y that I mailed four true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid, to 
Joseph C. Fratto , J r . , attorney for appel lant , FRATTO & FRATTO, 
Metropolitan Law Bui lding, 431 South 300 East, Suite 101, Sa l t 
Lake City, Utah 84111, t h i s £_1_ day of Thrf&r 1986. 
__J2 i^i^ k^Jitl^ s^ar_ 
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uuK cM A* &*> 
41-1-1 IS. Seizure of vehicles stolen. Improperly registered. The 
department or any peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and take 
possession of any vehicle which is being operated with improper registra-
tion, or which the department or the peace officer has reason to believe 
has been stolen, or on which any motor number, manufacturer's number 
or identification mark has been defaced, altered or obliterated. Any peace 
officer so seiting or taking possession of such vehicle shall immediately 
notify the department of such action and shall hold the vehicle until noti-
fied by the department as to what further action should be taken regarding 
the disposition of the vehicle. 
41-C-UC10. Abandoned vehicles - Police officer removing -
Report — Procedure If not reclaimed, (a) No person shall abandon a 
vehicle upon any highway. 
(b) No person shall abandon a vehicle upon any public or private prop-
erty without the express or implied consent of the owner or person in 
lawful possession or control of the property. 
(e) Any police officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that a vehi-
cle has been abandoned may remove the vehicle or cause it to be removed, 
at the expense of the owner, to the nearest state impound yard or if none, 
to a garage or other place of safety and shall immediately send a written 
report of such removal to the state tax commission, motor vehicle division, 
which report shall include a description of the vehicle, the date, time and 
place of removal, the grounds for removal, and the name of the garage 
or place where the vehicle is stored Upon receipt of a report as provided, 
the state tax commission, motor vehicle division shall attempt to notify 
the registered owner of the vehicle, or any lien holder, giving the grounds 
for removal and the name of the garage or place where the vehicle is 
stored. If the vehicle is not registered in this state, the state Ux commis-
sion, motor vehicle division shall make a reasonable effort to notify the 
registered owner or any lien holder of the removal and the location of the 
vehicle. The state Ux commission, motor vehicle division shall forward a 
copy of the notice to the owner or person in charge of the garage or place 
where the vehicle is stored. 
(d) For the purposes of this section, a vehicle shall be presumed to be 
abandoned if it is left unattended on a highway for a period in excess of 
24 hours or on any public or private property without express or implied 
consent of the owner or person in lawful possession or control of the prop-
erty for a period in excess of seven days. 
(e) In any case where the motor number, manufacturer's number or 
identification mark of the abandoned vehicle has been defaced, altered or 
obliterated, the vehicle shall not be released or sold until the original 
motor number, manufacturer's number or identification mark has been 
replaced, or until a new number assigned by the motor vehicle division has 
been stamped thereon. 
(0 If the abandoned vehicle is not reclaimed by the egistered owns1 
or any lien bolder within 30 days after actual notice or reasonable attemp; 
to give notice to the registered owner or any lien holder, the provisions 
of sections 41-1-79.5 and 41-1-116 shall apply, and the abandoned vehicle 
may be sold as provided in section 41-1-185. 
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Ufcf, CodL 4nn. ($vp J?*?), 
M-37-3. SubsUnces wbicb are controlled — Revised federal schedules gov* 
em. (1) All controlled substances listed in section 58-37-4 are hereby controlled. 
(2) All controlled substances listed in the Federal Controlled Substances Act 
(Title II, PJL 91-513), as it is amended from time to time, are hereby controlled. 
(3) Whenever any subsunce is designated, rescheduled or deleted as a eon* 
trolled subsunce in schedules I, II, III, IV or V of the Federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act (Title II, P.L. 91*513), as such schedules may be revised by 
Congressional enactment or by administrative rule of the United Sutes Attorney 
General adopted pursuant to section 201 of that act, that subsequent designation, 
rescheduling or deletion shall govern. 
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[ (*M An/soKlU (Ml) 
TH-44. Trladpale* defined.—Ail persona concerned in tbe eommis-
aion of a crime, aitber felony or misdemeanor, whether they directly com-
mit tbe act aonatituting tbe offenae or aid and abet in iu commisaion or, 
not being preeent, have edviaed and encouraged ita commiuion, and all 
persons connecting, advieing or encouraging children under the age of 
fourteen year*, lunatics or idiots to commit any crime, and all peraoni 
who by fraud, contrivance or force occaaion tbe drunkenness of another 
for tbe purpose of canting him to commit any crime, or who by threate, 
menaecs, command or coercion compel another to commit any crime, are 
prineipala in any crime ao committed. 
.U UU ftntVtM (/*53)# Ui *m<nJec( 
761-402. Separata offenaee ariiing out of aingla criminal episode— 
Included offenaea.— (1) A defendant may be proaecuted in a aingle crim-
inal action for all separate offenaes erieing out of a aingle Criminal cpiaode; 
however, when the a&me act of a defendant under a aingle criminal apiaode 
ah all eatabliah offenaea which may be punished in different waya under 
different provision* of this code, the act ahall be punishable under only ona 
auch provision; an acquittal or conviction and aentence under any eucb 
provision bars a prosecution under any other auch provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may eatablish separate offenaea under a aingla 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise ordcra to promote justice, a 
defendant ahall not be subject to aeparate trials for multiple offenaea when: 
(a) The offenaea are within tbe jurisdiction of a aingle court, and 
(b) The offenaea are known to tbe prosecuting attorney at the time 
the defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offenae included in the of-
fenae charged but may not be convicted of both the offenae charged and 
the included offenae. An offenae ia ao included when: 
(a) It ia established by proof of the same or lesa than all the facta 
required to establish the commission of tbe offenae charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prep-
aration to commit the offense charged or an offenae otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It ia specifically designated by a statute aa a leaaer included 
offenae. 
(4) The court ahall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect 
to an included offenae unless there ia a rational basis for a verdict acquit-
ting the defendant of the offenae charged and convicting bim of tbe in-
cluded offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an 
appellate court on appeal or certiorari, ahall determine that there ia insuf-
ficient evidence to aupport a conviction for the offense charged but that 
there ia aufBcient evidence to aupport a conviction for an included offenae 
and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction 
of that included offenae, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be act 
aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for tbe included 
offense, without neceaaitr of a new trial, if auch relief ia aougbt by tbe 
defendant 
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Tt-S-Ma. Criminal responsibility for direct oommisslon of offense or 
for oondoet of another.—Every person, acting with the mental state re-
quired for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, 
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another 
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally 
liable as a party for such conduct 
Tt-3-103. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of Imprisonment — 
Increese of sentence If firearm used. A person who hsi been convicted of a felony 
msy be sentenced to imprisonment for sn indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the esse of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than five 
years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be for life but 
if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm 
was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shsll addition-
ally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concur* 
rentlr. 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less than 
one year nor more thsn IS yesrs but if the trier of fsct finds s firesrm or a facsim-
ile or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance 
of the felony, the court shsll additionally sentence the person convicted for a term 
of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may addition-
ally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed five 
years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the representation 
of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court 
msy additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(4) Any person who hss been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony 
in which a firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment of the felony and 
is convicted of another felony when a firearm was used or involved in the accom-
plishment of the felony shsll, in addition to any other sentence imposed, be sen-
tenced for an indeterminate term to be not less thsn five nor more than ten years 
to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
7&-H03. Afgrarated assault.—(1) A person commits aggraYated as-
sault if be commits sssault as defined in section 76-5-102 and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or force likely to produce 
desth or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a felony of the third degree. 
7&-W0L Bobbexy.-d) Bobbery is the unlawful and intentional 
U k ^ p e r s o n s T ^ o p e n ; in the possession of another from hispmon 
or immediate presence^sgainat hi. will, accomplished by mean, of force 
or fear. 
(2) Bobbery fe a felony of the second de| ree. 
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TM-S03 Af granted robbery/—(1) A parson tommiu aggravated 
robbery if in the course of committing robbery, hs: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a faesimile of a 
knife or a deadly weapon^ or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first degree. 
(8) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be deemed to be "in lbs 
oourse of committing a robbery*' if it occurs in an attempt to commit, dur-
ing the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
torn mission of a robbery. 
T64-402. Presumptions and defenses.—The following presumption shaT 
be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory ox* 
planation of such possession is made, ahall be deemed prima facie evidence 
that the person in possession stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in 
the property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that 
the actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for 
purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the 
repayment of a debt or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service 
involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or 
exercise control over the property or service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service honestly 
believing that the owner, if present, would have consented. 
76-6-404. Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof* 
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TIM13. Theft—Classification of offenses—Action for treble damages 
iftlnst rooelver of stolen property.—(1) Theft of property and services 
as provided in this chapter shall be punishable as follows: 
(a) As a felony of the second degree If: 
(i) The value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; or 
(ii) The property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; or 
(iii) The actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the tbaft; 
•r 
(iv) The property is stolen from the person of another. 
(b) As a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services is more than $250 but not 
more than $1,000; or 
(ii) The actor has been twice before convicted of theft of property or 
services valued at $250 or leu; or 
(iii) When the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, 
heifer, ateer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry. 
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250. . 
(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property atolen was 
$100 or leas. 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of subsection 
(1), of section 76-M08 may bring an action against any person mentioned 
in (d) for tiree times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by 
the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
you are instructed that to the Information each defendant 
has entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not guilty denies 
each of the essential allegations of the charge contained in 
the Information and casts upon the State the burden of proving 
each to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. II 
The burden of proving a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
Joubt rests upon the State. This burden never shifts to a 
defendant. The law does not require a defendant to prove his 
innocence, to call any witnesses, or to produce any evidence. If the 
State fails to prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the jury must acquit him. 
INSTRUCTION NO. IH 
The law expressly gives each defendant the privilege of 
remaining silent at all stages of any proceedings against him. 
The fact that he has not taken the witness stand must not be 
considered as any indication of defendant's guiltf nor should 
you indulge in any presumption or inference adverse to defendant 
by reason thereof. The burden remains with the State to prove, 
by evidence, guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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XNSTRUCTIO NO. I*f 
Under the law of the State of Utah, possession of property 
recently stolen, when a person in possession fails to make a 
satisfactory explanation of such possession, is a fact from which 
you may infer that the person in possession stole such property. 
INSTRUCTION NO. *r7 
You are instructed that each defendant has claimed 
that at the time of the alleged Aggravated Robbery, Aggra-
vated Assault, and Theft, for which the charges in this 
case have been made by the State, that at said time he was 
at another place and therefore could not have committed the 
crimes in question. Such evidence as has been presented with 
respect to this claim is to be weighed and considered by 
you in considering all the evidence received in this case. 
The defendant has no burden to establish such defense by any 
particular degree of proof. The burden remains with the State 
throughout the course of the trial to establish the guilt of 
the defendant by evidence which convinces you beyond a reason-
able doubt. The evidence bearing upon the defendantfs claim 
should be considered by you in connection with all the other 
evidence bearing upon this case. 
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